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 Accommodation Without 
Compromise: Comment on Alberta v. 
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony 
Richard Moon* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The regulations in Alberta dealing with driver’s licences were 
amended in 2003 to require that all licence holders be photographed. The 
licence holder’s photo would appear on his or her licence and be in-
cluded in a facial recognition data bank maintained by the province.1 
Prior to this change, the regulations had permitted the Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles to grant an exemption to an individual who, for religious rea-
sons, objected to having her or his photo taken. Members of the 
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, who believe that the Second 
Commandment prohibits the making of photographic images, had been 
exempted from the photo requirement under the old regulations, but were 
required under the new law to be photographed before a licence would be 
issued.2  
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1
 Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 
567, at para. 6 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”]. Driver’s licences in Alberta are governed 
by the Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. T-6, and regulations made pursuant to the Act. The power 
of the Registrar to grant exceptions to the photo requirement contained in the Operator Licensing 
and Vehicle Control Regulation, Alta. Reg. 320/2002, was eliminated in May 2003 (Operator Li-
censing and Vehicle Control Amendment Regulation, Alta. Reg. 137/2003, s. 3). Under the current 
regulations the Registrar “must require an image of the applicant’s face, for incorporation in the 
licence, be taken”. The regulations also provide that the photo may be used for “facial recognition 
software for the purpose of the identification of, or the verification of the identity of, a person who 
has applied for an operator’s licence”: id. 
2
 The members of the Colony considered photographs to be “likenesses” within the mean-
ing of the Second Commandment (Exodus, 20). A member who allowed his or her photo to be taken 
might be censured by the community (id., at para. 29, per Mclachlin C.J.C.). In response to the Hut-
terian Brethren’s objection to the new regulation, the province proposed a compromise: while a 
photograph would be taken of each licence holder and entered into the facial recognition data bank, 
it would not be included on the actual licence. The non-photo driver’s licence would be marked as 
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The members of the Wilson Colony challenged the constitutionality 
of the photo requirement, arguing that it breached their section 2(a) and 
section 15 rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 
and could not be justified under section 1. They argued that no one from 
the Colony would be able to obtain a driver’s licence and that this would 
affect the Colony’s ability to purchase and sell goods, which was neces-
sary to the maintenance of its agrarian and communal way of life. 
Enforcement of the new regulation would require Colony members to 
choose between two elements of their religious commitment, respect for 
the Second Commandment’s prohibition on the creation of images and 
conformity to a way of life based on collective ownership and commu-
nity independence and self-sufficiency.  
A judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench held that the universal photo 
requirement limited the Colony members’ right to freedom of religion 
under section 2(a) and that the province had not demonstrated that this 
limit was justified under section 1. While the judge thought that the ob-
jective of preventing identity theft was pressing and substantial, he found 
that the restriction did not meet the minimal impairment requirement, 
since the province had not accommodated the “distinctive character of 
the burdened group ... to the point of undue hardship”.4 This, the judge 
noted, was the standard applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mul-
tani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys.5 A majority of the 
Alberta Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the province had 
not demonstrated that the universal photo requirement was justified  
under section 1. Justice Conrad for the majority held that the universal 
photo requirement did not reasonably accommodate the sincerely held 
religious belief of the Colony members.  
The decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal was overturned by a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court of Canada in a judgment written by Chief 
Justice McLachlin (Binnie, Deschamps, and Rothstein JJ. concurring). 
Dissenting reasons were given by Abella J. and by LeBel J. (Fish J. con-
curring). The majority judgment of McLachlin C.J.C. accepts that the 
photo requirement breaches the section 2 (a) rights of the Wilson Colony 
members, but finds that the breach is justified under section 1. When 
                                                                                                             
“Not to be used for identification purposes.” The province’s proposal was rejected by the members 
of the Wilson Colony, who insisted that they could not be photographed.  
3
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
4
 Supra, note 1, at para. 16 (quoted by McLachlin C.J.C.).  
5
 [2006] S.C.J. No. 6, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Multani”]. 
(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)   ACCOMMODATION WITHOUT COMPROMISE 97 
considering whether the restriction of the religious practice is justified 
under section 1, McLachlin C.J.C makes two general observations that 
are noteworthy. First, she insists that the minimal impairment component 
of the Oakes6 test does not involve the balancing of competing interests 
— that any balancing should be deferred until the final step of the Oakes 
test when the court weighs the costs and benefits of the restriction. This 
view has been expressed by the Chief Justice in previous decisions. The 
second and more significant assertion is that “reasonable accommodation 
analysis” is not appropriate when the court is considering whether a law 
that restricts a religious practice is justified under section 1. According to 
McLachlin C.J.C.: “A law’s constitutionality under s. 1 of the Charter is 
determined not by whether it is responsive to the unique needs of every 
individual claimant, but rather by whether its infringement of Charter 
rights is directed at an important objective and is proportionate in its 
overall impact.”7 
The Chief Justice insists that the issue for the Court when determin-
ing whether a restrictive law is justified under section 1 is whether the 
law meets the requirements of the Oakes test, and most significantly the 
requirement that the benefits of the restriction outweigh its costs. But 
what does this proportionality analysis involve, if not a judgment about 
the reasonable balance or trade-off between the competing public and 
religious claims? It is possible that in repudiating “reasonable accommo-
dation analysis”, the Chief Justice intends to exclude court-created 
exceptions to general statutory rules. The Court will not consider whether 
an exception should be made to the law for a religious practice, but sim-
ply whether the law is justified and should be upheld. Yet it is difficult to 
understand why the Court would rule out the creation of an exemption, 
but contemplate the striking down of the law (in whole or in part), on the 
basis that it interferes with a religious practice. The creation of an excep-
tion would compromise the law’s effectiveness to some degree, but 
striking down the law would completely prevent the government from 
pursuing its policy. Despite her formal repudiation of reasonable accom-
modation analysis, the Chief Justice frames the issue at the final stage of 
the Oakes test, as whether an exception to the photo requirement should 
be made. She considers the impact of a religious exception on the reali-
zation of the state’s policy and finds that an exception would 
compromise the policy. She concludes on this basis that the state is  
                                                                                                             
6
 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
7
 Supra, note 1, at para. 69, per McLachlin C.J.C. 
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justified in not recognizing such an exception. The other possible under-
standing of the Chief Justice’s repudiation of reasonable accommodation 
is that the courts should not require the state to compromise its policy to 
accommodate the spiritual needs of a particular individual. The difficulty 
with this is that the courts have interpreted section 2(a) as an individual 
right that protects any practice that the individual sincerely believes has 
spiritual significance, whether or not this belief is shared by others.  
The Chief Justice’s rejection of reasonable accommodation analysis 
signals a shift, however oblique or ambiguous, to a weaker standard of 
justification for state limits on religious practice. Chief Justice McLach-
lin follows the steps of the Oakes test and frames the issue as the 
balancing of competing state and religious interests. Adherence to the 
steps of the Oakes test gives the appearance of a rigorous justification 
process. However, she is not, as she claims, directing the Court back to 
the potentially rigorous requirements of the Oakes test, but instead creat-
ing an entirely formal test that lacks clear content and real substance. 
While the Chief Justice keeps open the possibility that a restrictive law 
may be struck down at the final stage of the Oakes test (because the costs 
to religious freedom outweigh the benefits of the law), the consequence 
of her rejection of “reasonable accommodation” may be that state law 
will invariably prevail over religious practice in the “balancing” of inter-
ests. A restriction will be justified as long as the law has a legitimate 
purpose and the restriction is necessary to advance that purpose. The 
scope of a law may be tailored to “exempt” a religious practice, if this 
can be done without compromising the law’s purpose, in other words if it 
is not really an exemption at all, and the restrictive law would otherwise 
fail the minimal impairment test. The state will not be required to com-
promise its policies in any meaningful way to make space for a religious 
practice.  
In rejecting the reasonable accommodation standard, the majority 
judgment in Hutterian Brethren appears to diverge from the Court’s pre-
vious section 2(a) decisions. This divergence, however, may not be very 
dramatic. In very few cases have the Canadian courts held that the law 
should accommodate a religious practice. These include cases in which 
the objective of the law could be achieved without restricting the reli-
gious practice in any significant way (i.e., when the minimal impairment 
test is failed); the law’s objective is paternalistic so that no one other than 
the religious adherent is directly affected by the exemption; and the 
“secular” law reflects and advantages the cultural or religious practices 
of the majority community.  
(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)   ACCOMMODATION WITHOUT COMPROMISE 99 
The Chief Justice’s reasons reveal an ambivalence about the state’s 
duty to compromise its policies to make space for religious practice and 
an uncertainty about the place of religion in the public life of the com-
munity. In a democratic community, individuals are often subject to laws 
with which they disagree and which limit their activities. The argument 
that religious beliefs and practices should be insulated or protected from 
public action rests on an assumption that they are different from other 
beliefs and practices, that they are deeply rooted and tied to the individ-
ual’s identity. The individual may experience the restriction of her or his 
practices not simply as a rejection of her or his views or values, but as a 
denial of her or his equal worth. Moreover, religious beliefs and practices 
may be treated as a private matter towards which the state should remain 
neutral, because we know through experience how difficult it is to recon-
cile competing religious views within a democratic political community.  
However, the difficulty with treating religion as a private matter 
that should be insulated from public action is that religious beliefs in-
volve truth claims that are contestable and that often have public 
implications. Most religions have something to say about how we 
should act towards others and the kind of community we should work 
to create. State neutrality towards religion, and more particularly the 
insulation of religion from public decision-making, is workable only if 
we imagine that religion operates in an entirely separate sphere from 
politics. The Chief Justice’s reservations about reasonable accommoda-
tion rest on a concern that the Court’s subjective understanding of 
religion (a practice will fall within the protection of section 2(a) if the 
individual has a sincere belief in its spiritual significance) means that 
state law may conflict with religious practice in a myriad of ways that 
cannot reasonably be predicted in advance. However, the larger difficulty 
with the subjective understanding of religious belief is that it makes the 
distinction between religious and other beliefs and practices, and the in-
sulation of religious practices from public action, more difficult to 
justify.  
While it may sometimes be useful to treat religion as separate from 
politics, the insulation (and exclusion) of religion from public decision-
making will inevitably be partial and pragmatic. Accommodation will 
occur at the margins of law, and will involve only minor trade-offs that 
do not significantly affect the advancement of democratic policies. It will 
not involve a full-blown balancing of competing public and religious 
interests (in which the state’s objectives might sometimes be subordi-
nated to the needs or interests of a religious community). Religious 
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practices will be protected or given space when it is possible to treat 
them as “private”; most notably when the practice does not directly con-
flict with public policy and other means may be adopted by the state to 
advance its objectives that do not interfere with the practice, and perhaps 
also when the religious practice is viewed as a personal matter of limited 
public interest and involves risk or harm only to the actor.  
II. THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
Chief Justice McLachlin draws from the Court’s earlier decisions in 
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem8 and Multani9 a two-part test for deter-
mining whether section 2(a) has been breached. The issues for the Court 
are (1) whether “the claimant sincerely believes in a belief or practice 
that has a nexus with religion”; and (2) whether “the impugned measure 
interferes with the claimant’s ability to act in accordance with his or her 
religious beliefs in a manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial”.10 
Chief Justice McLachlin notes that there was no dispute in the courts 
below that the photo requirement breached section 2(a). She wonders 
whether the government should have so readily conceded the breach of 
section 2(a) (and in particular that the interference was not trivial), but 
nevertheless addresses only the section 1 issue and the proper application 
of the Oakes test to the photo requirement. 
Chief Justice McLachlin finds that the purpose behind the photo re-
quirement (of reducing the risk of identity theft by ensuring the integrity 
of the driver’s licence system) is pressing and substantial.11 She accepts 
that the inclusion of driver’s licence photos in a digital data bank will 
“ensure that each licence in the system is connected to a single individ-
ual, and that no individual has more than one licence”, which in turn will 
help to prevent the fraudulent acquisition of driver’s licences.12 In ad-
dressing the rational connection and minimal impairment tests, the Chief 
                                                                                                             
8
 [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Amselem”]. 
9
 Supra, note 5. 
10
 Supra, note 1, at para. 32, where she continues noting that “‘[t]rivial or insubstantial’ in-
terference is interference that does not threaten actual religious beliefs or conduct.”  
11
 Id., at para. 4:  
The goal of setting up a system that minimizes the risk of identity theft associated with 
driver’s licences is a pressing and important public goal. The universal photo requirement 
is connected to this goal and does not limit freedom of religion more than required to 
achieve it. Finally, the negative impact on the freedom of religion of Colony members 
who wish to obtain licences does not outweigh the benefits associated with the universal 
photo requirement.  
12
 Id., at para. 42. 
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Justice reiterates a view she has expressed in other Charter cases, that 
these tests are concerned simply with the relationship between the law’s 
restrictive means and its pressing and substantial ends, and do not  
involve the balancing of competing interests.13 The Chief Justice insists 
that the balancing of competing interests (the importance of the law’s 
objective versus the value of the right) should be deferred until the final 
part of the Oakes analysis. In her view, the universal photo requirement 
advances the law’s objective rationally and without unnecessarily re-
stricting the right.14 She considers that any alternative to the universal 
photo requirement would compromise the government’s objective: the 
prevention of identity fraud.  
In the course of her discussion of the minimal impairment require-
ment, the Chief Justice argues that minimal impairment and reasonable 
accommodation are conceptually distinct and should not be equated. 
Reasonable accommodation analysis, which is drawn from human rights 
statutes and jurisprudence, “envisions a dynamic process whereby the 
parties — most commonly an employer and employee — adjust the 
terms of their relationship in conformity with the requirements of human 
rights legislation, up to the point at which accommodation would mean 
undue hardship for the accommodating party”.15 In her view, “[t]he rela-
tionship between the legislature and the people subject to its laws is 
entirely different.” Because “[l]aws are general in their scope and cannot 
simply be tailored to the needs and circumstances of a particular individ-
ual”, the legislature cannot be expected to engage in such an 
“individualized determination”.16 Indeed, given the many ways in which 
laws may restrict religious practice (or the many ways in which religious 
practices may conflict with law) the legislature could not possibly tailor 
its laws to every sincerely held religious belief. The justification of a law 
under section 1 depends not on “whether it is responsive to the unique 
needs of every individual claimant”, but instead on whether it advances a 
substantial and pressing purpose and is proportionate in its overall  
impact.17 She acknowledges that “the law’s impact on the individual 
                                                                                                             
13
 See, for example, R. v. Lucas, [1998] S.C.J. No. 28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439 (S.C.C.). 
14
 Supra, note 1, at para. 35 where McLachlin C.J.C. notes also that 
[the Court] has recognized that a measure of leeway must be accorded to governments in 
determining whether limits on rights in public programs that regulate social and commer-
cial interactions are justified under s. 1 of the Charter. Often, a particular problem or area 
of activity can reasonably be remedied or regulated in a variety of ways. 
15
 Id., at para. 68, per McLachlin C.J.C. 
16
 Id., at para. 69. 
17
 Id. 
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claimants” may be an important consideration in the court’s judgment 
concerning the justification of the law at the final stage of the Oakes test; 
but the issue for the court is “whether the Charter infringement is justifi-
able in a free and democratic society, not whether a more advantageous 
arrangement for a particular claimant could be envisioned”.18 The Court 
must decide whether the law should be struck down as unjustified,  
because its public benefits are outweighed by its costs to a religious prac-
tice, and not whether a particular individual or group of individuals 
should be exempted from its requirements. According to the Chief Jus-
tice, the appropriate standard at the final balancing stage of the 
proportionality analysis is not the human rights standard of undue hard-
ship. In her view, this “pivotal concept in reasonable accommodation, is 
not easily applicable to a legislature enacting laws”.19 “It is better,” says 
McLachlin C.J.C., “to speak in terms of minimal impairment and propor-
tionality of effects” rather than undue hardship.20  
Chief Justice McLachlin observes that the reasonable accommoda-
tion standard may be appropriate when “a government action or 
administrative practice is alleged to violate the claimant’s Charter 
rights”.21 In such cases, says McLachlin C.J.C., “the jurisprudence on the 
duty to accommodate, which applies to governments and private parties 
alike, may be helpful ‘to explain the burden resulting from the minimal 
impairment test with respect to a particular individual’.”22 An individual-
ized remedy in the form of accommodation may be appropriate in a case 
such as Multani, when the claim concerns the impact of an administrative 
decision on a particular individual and a personal remedy is sought under 
section 24 of the Charter. In such a case, the claimant does not challenge 
general legislative policy but claims simply that the state actor failed to 
perform its duties in a way that took into account the religious beliefs or 
practices of particular members of the community.23 
According to McLachlin C.J.C., “the decisive analysis” in the Hutte-
rian Brethren case occurs at the final stage of the Oakes test: “whether 
                                                                                                             
18
 Id. 
19
 Id., at para. 70: While the standard of “undue hardship” may be interpreted broadly to en-
compass “the hardship that comes with failing to achieve a pressing government objective, this 
attenuates the concept”.  
20
 Id., at para. 70. 
21
 Id., at para. 67 (emphasis in original). 
22
 Id., at para. 67, quoting from Charron J. in Multani, supra, note 5, at para. 53. But in that 
paragraph from Multani, Charron J. refers to the adverse affect on an individual of “a policy or rule 
that is neutral on its face”. 
23
 As noted below, this is not how the Multani judgment describes the issue.  
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the ‘deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or groups’ outweigh 
the public benefit that may be gained from the measure”.24 Chief Justice 
McLachlin finds, “on the evidence that the universal photo requirement 
enhances the security of the licensing system …”.25 She accepts that re-
quiring all licence holders in the province to have their photo included in 
a digital photo bank “will accomplish these security-related objectives 
more effectively than would an exemption for an as yet undetermined 
number of religious objectors”.26 Any form of exemption would detract 
from the effectiveness of the system, because it would “undermine the 
certainty with which the government is able to say that a given licence 
corresponds to an identified individual and that no individual holds more 
than one licence”.27  
When considering the “cost” of the regulation, McLachlin C.J.C. is 
clear that the Court must look at its real impact on the individual’s ability 
to practise her or his religion.28 In this case, says McLachlin C.J.C., the 
photo requirement does not compel the individual Colony member to 
have her or his photo taken.29 She accepts that the law does make  
                                                                                                             
24
 Supra, note 1, at para. 78, per McLachlin C.J.C.: The issue is “whether the deleterious ef-
fects are out of proportion to the public good achieved by the infringing measure”.  
25
 Id., at para. 80: “The photo requirement ensures both a ‘one-to-one’ and ‘one-to-many’ 
correspondence among licence holders. This makes it possible, through the use of computer soft-
ware, to ensure that no person holds more than one licence.” 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id. She continues at para. 81:  
Though it is difficult to quantify in exact terms how much risk of fraud would result from 
permitted exemptions, it is clear that the internal integrity of the system would be com-
promised. In this respect, the present case may be contrasted with previous religious 
freedom cases where this Court has found that the potential risk was too speculative.  
28
 When determining the negative impact of the measure on the religious freedom of the 
members of the Wilson Colony, McLachlin C.J.C. says, id., at para. 90, that while the court should 
consider “the perspective of the religious or conscientious claimant”, it must do so “in the context of 
a multicultural, multi-religious society where the duty of state authorities to legislate for the general 
good inevitably produces conflicts with individual beliefs”. From the perspective of the religious 
community, any law that restricts or impedes its religious practices is unacceptable. The restrictive 
law, however, may advance a legitimate public policy — a policy that from a secular perspective is 
unobjectionable, or at least the only objection to it is that it interferes with a practice that matters 
deeply to some members of the community.  
29
 Id., at para. 93. The Chief Justice distinguishes the claim in this case from that in R. v. 
Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.) or Multani, supra, 
note 5, “where the incidental and unintended effect of the law is to deprive the adherent of a mean-
ingful choice as to the religious practice” (at para. 96). The contrast is with a situation in which the 
government measure is “compulsory” so that “the adherent is left with a stark choice between violat-
ing his or her religious belief and disobeying the law” (at para. 94). The question not clearly 
answered by McLachlin C.J.C. is when is a constraint so significant that it removes the individual’s 
choice? The majority cites Multani as an example, although perhaps one could argue that there was 
an alternative available in that case which the family followed, and that was to send their child to a 
private school. Is the constraint less significant in this case? 
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adherence to the practice more onerous, but she does not consider the 
cost of not being able to drive on the highway to be significant, and sug-
gests that the Colony members could hire others to do their necessary 
driving.30 She acknowledges that relying on outsiders might also detract 
from the community’s “traditional self-sufficiency”; however she seems 
to exclude this from her calculation, perhaps regarding it as a cultural 
“tradition” rather than a religious practice.31 Chief Justice McLachlin 
also downplays the significance of the restriction by describing the ac-
quisition of a driver’s licence as a “privilege” rather than a right.32 In her 
view, the costs of the regulation do not seriously affect the claimants’ 
right to pursue their religion and do “not negate the choice that lies at the 
heart of freedom of religion”.33 
Chief Justice McLachlin concludes that the benefit of the law out-
weighs its negative impact on religious practice. The law has an 
important social goal: to maintain an effective driver’s licence scheme 
and so minimize the risk of identity fraud. She accepts that the universal 
photo requirement “will reduce the risk of identity-related fraud, when 
compared to a photo requirement that permits exceptions”.34 On the other 
side, while the photo requirement does make the religious practice of the 
colony members more costly, it “does not deprive members of their abil-
ity to live in accordance with their beliefs”. Its deleterious effects “fall at 
the less serious end of the scale”.35  
The majority judgment requires the state to justify under section 1 
any non-trivial restriction on a religious practice, but rejects “reasonable 
accommodation” as the standard of justification. While reasonable ac-
commodation may be the appropriate standard in the case of a restriction 
on religious practice that is imposed by a private actor, such as an em-
ployer, or by a government actor in the exercise of her or his discretion, 
McLachlin C.J.C. insists that it should not be applied to statutory and 
                                                                                                             
30
 Id., at para. 97 : “Many businesses and individuals rely on hired persons and commercial 
transport for their needs, either because they cannot drive or choose not to drive.”  
31
 Id. 
32
 Id., at para. 95: 
Many religious practices entail costs which society reasonably expects the adherents to 
bear. In this case, the inability of the claimants to access a conditional benefit or privi-
lege, a driver’s licence, is such a cost. A limit on the right that exacts a cost but 
nevertheless leaves the adherent with a meaningful choice about the religious practice at 
issue will be less serious than a limit that effectively deprives the adherent of such choice. 
33
 Id., at para. 99. She also observes that while the Charter guarantees freedom of religion it 
“does not indemnify practitioners against all costs incident to the practice of religion”. 
34
 Id., at para. 101. 
35
 Id., at para. 102. 
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other legal restrictions on religious practice. Laws are general in their 
scope and so religious practices may conflict with them in many ways. 
The legislature could not possibly tailor its laws to every sincerely held 
religious belief. The issue for the Court, according to McLachlin C.J.C., 
is not whether an exception should be made to the law for the religious 
practice of a particular individual or group, but whether the law is justi-
fied under section 1 and the Oakes test — and in particular the final step 
of the test, which involves the balancing of competing religious and state 
interests.  
III. IF NOT REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION? 
The Chief Justice accepts that section 2(a) is breached any time the 
state restricts a religious practice in a non-trivial way. Even if it is pursu-
ing a legitimate public objective, the state must justify the restriction 
under section 1. The justification issue turns on the appropriate balance 
between competing state and religious interests. The restrictive law will 
be struck down if its costs to religious practice outweigh its benefits to 
public policy. But how is this balancing of interests different from rea-
sonable accommodation?36  
Perhaps the Chief Justice means only to preclude an individual claim 
to an exemption from a general law, but not more general claims or a 
claim made by a religious group. Individual claims to exemption are po-
tentially unlimited and, as the Chief Justice observes, may impede the 
state’s ability to advance important public policies. The problem with this 
reading of McLachlin C.J.C.’s test is that the Court has interpreted free-
dom of religion as an individual right and defined the activity protected 
by section 2(a) in subjective terms: an activity is religious and prima fa-
cie protected under section 2(a) if the individual actor has a sincere belief 
in its spiritual significance, whether or not anyone else also holds this 
belief. Viewed from this perspective, the claim by the Wilson Colony is 
                                                                                                             
36
 Id., at para.66:  
In my view, a distinction must be maintained between the reasonable accommodation 
analysis undertaken when applying human rights laws, and the s. 1 justification analysis 
that applies to a claim that a law infringes the Charter. Where the validity of a law is at 
stake, the appropriate approach is a s. 1 Oakes analysis. Under this analysis, the issue at 
the stage of minimum impairment is whether the goal of the measure could be accom-
plished in a less infringing manner. The balancing of effects takes place at the third and 
final stage of the proportionality test. If the government establishes justification under the 
Oakes test, the law is constitutional. If not, the law is null and void under s. 52 insofar as 
it is inconsistent with the Charter. 
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really a series of identical claims made by a group of individuals who 
share a particular belief. Indeed, in rejecting the argument that the crea-
tion of an exception to the photo requirement for the Wilson Colony 
members will have a minor impact on the government’s policy, the Chief 
Justice notes that we simply do not know how many other individuals 
may come forward to claim an exemption.  
Another possible reading of the Chief Justice’s test is that while the 
Court may strike down the restrictive law, if it fails any part of the Oakes 
test, the Court will not create an exception to the law. The Court’s role, 
says the Chief Justice, is to determine the constitutionality of the law and 
not to work out a fair or appropriate compromise between the law and 
the religious practice. The reason the Chief Justice gives for rejecting 
“reasonable accommodation” is that it is impractical. She observes that 
religious practices may conflict with law in countless ways. The govern-
ment’s ability to pursue its different policies will be severely impeded if 
it is required to accommodate a wide range of religious practices, par-
ticularly if the standard of accommodation is whether the government 
would experience undue hardship. Yet it is difficult to understand why 
the Court would rule out the creation of an exemption, but contemplate 
the striking down of the law (in whole or in part) because it interferes 
with a religious practice and its costs outweigh its benefits. Creating an 
exception to the law might compromise the state’s ability to pursue a par-
ticular policy, but striking down the law would prevent the state from 
pursuing that policy entirely. If the Chief Justice believes that the Court 
should balance or trade off competing state and religious interests, it is 
difficult to understand why she believes that an exception to the law 
should not be granted in a case in which the purpose of the law is impor-
tant but the impact of an exception would be relatively minor, as in the 
Hutterian Brethren case. It makes little sense to say that a law may be 
struck down because it interferes with a religious practice but that it must 
never be tailored — compromised in some way — to create an exception 
for a religious practice. Indeed, when considering whether the photo re-
striction is justified under section 1, the Chief Justice frames the issue as 
whether an exception to the photo requirement should be made. She con-
siders both the cost of an exception to the realization of the state’s policy 
and the cost of law to the religious practice and decides that the province 
is justified in not permitting any exceptions to the requirement.  
I suspect that Chief Justice McLachlin’s rejection of the “reasonable 
accommodation” standard amounts to a rejection of any real “balancing” 
of competing religious and public interests, and of a duty on the state to 
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compromise its policy to make space for religious practices. I say this 
even though the Chief Justice insists that the significant analysis in the 
Hutterian Brethren case occurs at the final stage of the Oakes test and 
engages in something resembling balancing, when she considers the 
competing state and religious claims.37 She assesses both the costs and 
benefits of the restriction and decides that the public policy benefits out-
weigh the costs to the religious practice (and that the benefit of creating a 
religious exception to the law is outweighed by the cost of such an ex-
ception). However, this balancing appears to have little substance and to 
involve an entirely formal adherence to the Oakes test. Even though the 
majority judgment keeps open the possibility that a law might be struck 
down if its costs to religious freedom outweigh its salutary effects, the 
reasons that lie behind its rejection of reasonable accommodation analy-
sis make it unlikely that the Court would ever strike down a law at this 
stage of the analysis, as the outcome of interest balancing. As I will sug-
gest below, there are other impediments to a general balancing of 
competing interests that relate to the Court’s capacity to determine the 
value or weight of the particular religious practice and compare it to the 
value of the state’s policy.  
When deciding in this case that an exception should not be made to 
the law, the Chief Justice seems to overstate the impact of a religious ex-
emption on the effectiveness of the law, and understate the impact of the 
requirement on the Colony’s practices, and in particular its commitment 
to communal self-sufficiency. The impairment of the religious practice in 
this case gives way to what the dissenting judges regard as a minor cost 
to the efficiency of the photo identification system. It appears that the 
majority would be prepared to exempt the members of the Wilson Col-
ony from the photo requirement only if this could be done without 
compromising the law’s purpose in any meaningful way — that is to say, 
only if it is not truly an exception but simply a more careful tailoring of 
                                                                                                             
37
 I note here a matter worth exploring: In Hutterian Brethren, id., McLachlin C.J.C. at 
para. 108, adopts a narrow approach to the s. 15 claim — analogous to her s. 2(a) analysis:  
Assuming the respondents could show that the regulation creates a distinction on the 
enumerated ground of religion, it arises not from any demeaning stereotype but from a 
neutral and rationally defensible policy choice. There is no discrimination within the 
meaning of Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, as ex-
plained in Kapp. The Colony members’ claim is to the unfettered practice of their 
religion, not to be free from religious discrimination. The substance of the respondents’  
s. 15(1) claim has already been dealt with under s. 2(a). There is no breach of s. 15(1).  
She seems to say that as long as the law rationally advances a legitimate public policy and does not 
involve any stereotyping, there will be no breach of s. 15. Such an approach would seem to exclude 
a wide range of constructive discrimination claims. 
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the law to meet its objective without interfering to the same degree with 
the Colony’s religious practice. While the Chief Justice describes the  
issue as the balancing of competing interests (the state’s interest in pre-
venting identity fraud and the freedom of Colony members to adhere to 
their religious beliefs), she seems to give complete priority to the legisla-
tive policy, and refuses to require the government to compromise its 
policy in any way to make space for the Colony members’ religious prac-
tice. The government’s objective is the standard against which the 
restriction is judged as reasonable. 
The practical effect of McLachlin C.J.C.’s rejection of the “reason-
able accommodation” standard is that the state has no constitutional duty 
to compromise its policies to make space for religious practices.38 The 
court may find that the law fails the minimal impairment test, because it 
restricts the religious practice unnecessarily. In such a case the court may 
define the scope of the law more narrowly so that it does not restrict the 
practice. This might even be described as creating an exception to the 
law, but the recognition of such an “exception” is not the outcome of 
“balancing” and does not involve any real compromise of the law’s  
purpose.  
IV. THE DISSENTING JUDGMENTS  
There are two areas of disagreement between the majority and dis-
senting judgments. The first concerns the structure of Charter analysis, 
and in particular the Oakes test, and more particularly the minimal im-
pairment component of that test. The second concerns the proper reading 
of the facts, both the necessity of the photo requirement to the realization 
of the government’s objective, and the impact of the requirement on the 
religious life of the members of the Wilson Colony. 
In their separate dissenting judgments, Abella J. and Lebel J. affirm 
that the state has a duty to make reasonable accommodation for minority 
religious practices. The dissenting judges believe that the state must 
sometimes compromise the pursuit of an otherwise legitimate public pol-
icy to make space for religious practice.39 In their view, an exception 
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 The state may accommodate religious practices, but it is not constitutionally required to 
do so. This means, of course, that the religious practices of mainstream or politically influential 
groups will be accommodated — if they are not already built into the general norms and expecta-
tions of the community. 
39
 Supra, note 1. Justice Abella stated, at para. 134:  
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should be made for the practice of a religious group, if this can be done 
without significant cost to the advancement of the legislative goal. They 
consider that, because of the relatively small size of the Wilson Colony, 
the creation of an exemption from the photo requirement would have a 
minor impact on the law’s policy. To the dissenters this seems even more 
obvious given that there are many adults in Alberta who do not hold a 
driver’s licence and so will have no photo in the data bank.40 Finally, the 
dissenting judges place greater emphasis on self-sufficiency, as an ele-
ment of the Hutterite belief system that will be significantly affected if 
the community must rely on outsiders for their driving needs.  
Beneath these disagreements between the majority and the dissenters, 
about the facts of the case and the form of the analysis, lies a more general 
disagreement about the foundation and substance of the state’s duty to ac-
commodate religious practices. The majority judgment gives priority to the 
state’s policy and little substance to the justification requirement, while the 
dissenting judgments expect the state to compromise its policy to some 
extent to make space for the religious practice. The deeper issue for the 
Court concerns the relationship between law and religion and whether re-
ligion can and should be treated as a private matter that is both excluded 
and insulated from public decision-making.  
V. THE OAKES TEST  
While the majority and dissenting judgments in Hutterian Brethren 
disagree about the proper application of the different elements of the 
Oakes test, each assumes that there is a single (and correct) approach to 
the assessment of limits and seeks to fit the issue of religious restriction 
into this generic approach. The adjudication of rights claims under the 
Charter involves two steps. The first step is concerned with whether a 
Charter right has been breached by a state act. The court must define the 
                                                                                                             
The purpose of the Oakes analysis is to balance the benefits of the objective with the 
harmful effects of the infringement. The stages of the Oakes test are not watertight com-
partments: the principle of proportionality guides the analysis at each step. This ensures 
that at every stage, the importance of the objective and the harm to the right are weighed. 
40
 Id., at para. 115:  
Unlike the severity of its impact on the Hutterites, the benefits to the province of requir-
ing them to be photographed are, at best, marginal. Over 700,000 Albertans do not have a 
driver’s license and are therefore not in the province’s facial recognition database. There 
is no evidence that in the context of several hundred thousand unphotographed Albertans, 
the photos of approximately 250 Hutterites will have any discernable impact on the prov-
ince’s ability to reduce identity theft.  
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protected interest or activity and determine whether it has been interfered 
with by the state. The second step in the adjudicative process is con-
cerned with the justification of limits on Charter rights. The limitation 
decision is described by the courts as a balancing of competing interests 
or values — the individual Charter right balanced against the rights or 
interests advanced by the restrictive law.  
The Oakes test has several components.41 The court asks whether the 
restrictive law has a substantial and pressing purpose, advances this pur-
pose rationally, impairs the freedom no more than is necessary, and is 
proportionate to the impairment of the freedom. The first step of the 
Oakes test involves a judgment about the significance of the law’s gen-
eral purpose — whether the purpose is substantial enough to justify the 
restriction of a fundamental freedom. The next two steps involve an as-
sessment of the means chosen to advance that purpose. The rational 
connection test asks whether the means (the restrictive measure) “ration-
ally” advance the law’s substantial and pressing purpose. The minimal 
impairment test asks whether the measure restricts the protected activity 
more than is necessary to advance its purpose. The rational connection 
and minimal impairment tests are closely related. A law that does not 
rationally advance the pressing and substantial purpose for which it was 
enacted can be seen as unnecessarily restricting the right or freedom. 
Similarly, a law that restricts the right or freedom more than is necessary 
to advance its pressing purpose (that does not minimally impair the free-
dom) is to that extent irrational or ineffective. At the final stage of the 
Oakes test, the court compares or balances the restrictive law’s benefit or 
value with its actual costs to the right. 
In those cases in which the court finds that a restriction is not justi-
fied under section 1, the decision is often based on the minimal 
impairment test, and sometimes on the rational connection test. Un-
doubtedly these tests have come to play a central role in the courts’ 
assessment of limits under section 1 because they appear to involve noth-
ing more than a technical assessment of legislative means. A law may be 
struck down by the court not because its purpose is objectionable, or be-
cause the constitutional values it impedes outweigh the values it 
advances, but simply because the means chosen to advance that purpose 
are ineffective or will impair the protected freedom unnecessarily.  
                                                                                                             
41
 The discussion that follows draws on Richard Moon, “Justified Limits on Free Expres-
sion: The Collapse of the General Approach to Limits on Charter Rights” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall 
L.J. 337 [hereinafter “Moon, ‘Justified Limits’”].  
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However, in practice, these tests often involve more than simply an 
assessment of the effectiveness of the law’s means, divorced entirely 
from any judgment about the significance of the law’s purpose or the 
value of the restricted activity. They often involve an element of balanc-
ing or trade-off. The rational connection test must require something 
more than that the law’s means not be wholly irrational to its ends, or 
wholly ineffective to achieve those ends. Indeed, it would be difficult to 
attribute to a law a purpose that seemed unconnected to its provisions. 
Instead, the rational connection test involves a decision about whether 
the law reasonably advances the pressing and substantial purpose for 
which it was enacted — whether it meets some form of effectiveness 
threshold.42 If this is a relative judgment, it seems likely that it will be 
affected by considerations such as the value of the restricted activity or 
the significance of the law’s objective.  
Similarly, it will be very rare that an alternative measure that is less 
rights restrictive will advance the law’s substantial and compelling pur-
pose as completely or effectively. It appears that a law will fail the 
minimal impairment test when the court considers that a small decrease 
in the law’s effectiveness in achieving its pressing and substantial pur-
pose will significantly reduce its interference with the protected right. 
Chief Justice McLachlin recognizes this but insists that a more general or 
open balancing of interests should not occur at this stage of the analysis: 
“The test at the minimum impairment stage is whether there is an alterna-
tive, less drastic means of achieving the objective in a real and 
substantial manner.”43 According to Chief Justice McLachlin, the issue 
                                                                                                             
42
 Supra, note 1, at para. 48, per McLachlin C.J.C.: “The rational connection requirement is 
aimed at preventing limits being imposed on rights arbitrarily. The government must show that it is 
reasonable to suppose that the limit may further the goal, not that it will do so.” 
43
 Id., at paras. 54-55: 
[T]he minimum impairment test requires only that the government choose the least dras-
tic means of achieving its objective. Less drastic means which do not actually achieve the 
government’s objective are not considered at this stage. … I hasten to add that in consid-
ering whether the government’s objective could be achieved by other less drastic means, 
the court need not be satisfied that the alternative would satisfy the objective to exactly 
the same extent or degree as the impugned measure. In other words, the court should not 
accept an unrealistically exacting or precise formulation of the government’s objective 
which would effectively immunize the law from scrutiny at the minimal impairment 
stage. 
And at para. 53: 
 The question at this stage of the s. 1 proportionality analysis is whether the limit on 
the right is reasonably tailored to the pressing and substantial goal put forward to justify 
the limit. Another way of putting this question is to ask whether there are less harmful 
means of achieving the legislative goal.  
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for the court at this stage is whether the law’s purpose could be achieved 
just or almost as effectively without impairing the right or freedom to the 
same degree. In her view, the balancing between competing interests — 
between the detrimental impact of the restrictive law on the right or free-
dom and the public benefits of the law — should be deferred until the 
final stage of the proportionality analysis. Justice Lebel, in contrast, be-
lieves that the “court’s goal” at both the minimal impairment and 
contextual balancing stages of the Oakes test “is essentially the same”: 
“to strike the proper balance” between the state’s objective and Charter 
rights.44 Justice Abella agrees that the different stages of the Oakes test 
are not “watertight compartments” and that “at every stage, the impor-
tance of the objective and the harm to the right are weighed”.45  
The idea that there is, or could be, a single approach to the justifica-
tion of limits on Charter rights rests on an assumption that the rights 
protected in the Charter have the same basic structure, each right protect-
ing an aspect of the individual’s liberty from state interference. The court 
must define the scope of the protected right, and determine whether the 
state has interfered with its exercise. Since these rights may sometimes 
conflict with other valuable interests, the court must also determine the 
proper and just balance between these competing interests. Yet many or 
most Charter rights do not fit this individual liberty model and are better 
understood as relational or social in character, as protecting some dimen-
sion of the individual’s interaction or association with others. If the rights 
protected by the Charter are diverse in character, and concerned with dif-
ferent forms of individual involvement in community, then the nature or 
character of their limits may differ in significant ways.  
I have argued elsewhere that because freedom of expression rests on 
the social character of human agency and identity (or a recognition that 
agency and identity are realized in communicative interaction), it may 
not fit easily into the Charter’s two-step adjudicative process, which 
separates the individual’s interests from those of others.46 In the leading 
Canadian freedom of expression cases, the issue for the court is not the 
correct or reasonable balance between separate but competing interests. In 
cases dealing with picketing, advertising, hate speech and pornography the 
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 Id., at para. 191, per LeBel J. 
45
 Id., at para. 134, per Abella J. At the conclusion of her discussion of minimal impairment 
Abella J. seems to suggest that even if a law does not pass the minimal impairment test, it may be 
upheld if it satisfies the final step of the Oakes test (at para. 119). 
46
 See Richard Moon, The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2000), c. 2 and Moon, “Justified Limits”, supra, note 41.  
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argument for limitation is based either explicitly or implicitly on the irra-
tional appeal or manipulative character of the expression. The critical 
issue for the court seems to be whether the form or instance of expres-
sion in the particular context contributes to insight and understanding, or 
whether it manipulates or appeals to the irrational and “leads” to signifi-
cant harm. When the court assesses the manipulative impact of 
expression, it is not simply balancing the distinct interests of separate 
individuals — the interest of the speaker in communicating information 
and ideas against the interest of the audience in not being manipulated or 
deceived. Instead the court is making a contextual judgment about the 
relative value/harm of expression, or about the character or quality of the 
communicative relationship — about the realization of individual agency 
and identity in community life. In these cases, the “value” and “harm” of 
the expression are not distinct issues, but rather two sides of a single but 
complex issue. The court seeks to draw a line between expression that 
appeals to conscious reflection or autonomous judgment and expression 
that seeks to manipulate. But there is no bright line to be drawn. Where 
the court draws the line will depend on contextual factors and their im-
pact on individual judgment and on the seriousness of the harm that will 
occur if the communication is effective.  
Other constitutional rights may not fit easily into the two-step struc-
ture of constitutional rights adjudication. Certainly, it is difficult to see 
the right to equality under section 15 as simply a liberty or freedom from 
external interference. The state breaches section 15 when it fails to show 
the individual the respect or recognition that he or she is owed as a mem-
ber of the community. The right to equality rests on a recognition that 
when the members of a group are treated by the state as less worthy or 
deserving than others, their sense of identity or dignity may be negatively 
affected. The state does not discriminate against the individual or inter-
fere with her or his dignity simply because it withholds a benefit or 
imposes a burden on the individual. Nor does it discriminate against an 
individual simply because it has made something less than a fully  
rational policy choice. The Court has held that when determining 
whether a state act is “discriminatory”, it must ask whether the act rests 
on an unfair stereotype or contributes to the systemic exclusion or disad-
vantage of the members of a particular identity group. These are 
questions about larger social practices or circumstances, about the  
context of the particular state act. 
Given the relational character of the right to equality and the  
requirement that the courts look to the larger context to determine 
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whether an act is discriminatory, it is not surprising that the courts have 
struggled to develop a coherent approach to section 1 limits on section 15 
rights. In equality cases, the court’s section 1 analysis repeats in a fairly 
perfunctory way, the considerations that led to its decision that the state 
act is discriminatory contrary to section 15. While the significant analysis 
by the court in freedom of expression cases takes place at the section 1 
stage, the focus of the court’s analysis in equality cases is at the first 
stage of the adjudication, the issue of whether the right has been 
breached. In both cases, the analysis takes place at one stage of the adju-
dication, because the court is addressing a single, complex question 
about the individual’s connection with the community. It is not simply 
balancing separate and competing interests, as contemplated by the two-
step structure of adjudication. 
For similar reasons, freedom of religion claims may not fit well into 
the two-step structure of Charter adjudication, which separates issues of 
breach and justification. In a case such as R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,47 
where a law is found to breach section 2(a) because it compels citizens to 
follow a particular religious practice (or because it actively supports the 
practices of one religious group over those of another), it will invariably 
fail the “pressing and substantial” purpose component of the Oakes test.48 
As McLachlin C.J.C. in the Hutterian Brethren judgment notes, a law 
that compels a religious practice “will fail at the first stage of Oakes and 
proportionality will not need to be considered”.49  
At issue in the Hutterian Brethren case is the other dimension of re-
ligious freedom — the freedom to practise one’s religion without state 
interference. Because the Court has defined the scope of section 2(a) 
broadly, to encompass any practice that has spiritual significance for the 
individual, the focus of the Court’s analysis is on the justification of the 
restriction under section 1.50 The issue, according to both the dissenting 
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 [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.). 
48
 For a discussion of religious compulsion cases, see Richard Moon, “Government Support 
for Religious Practice” in R. Moon, ed., Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: 
U.B.C. Press, 2008) [hereinafter “Moon, Law and Religious Pluralism”]. 
49
 Supra, note 1, at para. 92.  
50
 Benjamin L. Berger, in his contribution to this volume, “Section 1, Constitutional Rea-
soning and Cultural Difference: Assessing the Impacts of Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson 
Colony”, observes (at 27) that “this test has made section 2(a) protection so capacious as to be 
largely analytically vacant”. His paper offers a valuable discussion of some of the implications of 
this focus on justification (at 28): “[w]hat is difficult about freedom of religion is the sheer scope of 
possible conflict between religion and government objectives combined with the enormous chal-
lenge of adjudicating the internal meaning and significance of a given religious practice or belief not 
shared by the secular state.” 
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and majority judgments, is the appropriate balance between the individ-
ual’s freedom to practise her or his religion and the state’s ability to 
pursue a particular public purpose. The majority and dissenting judg-
ments appear simply to disagree about where this balancing should occur 
in the Oakes test. However, behind this apparently minor dispute about 
the form of the test, lies a more fundamental disagreement about the sub-
stance of the balancing between competing state and religious interests. 
Chief Justice McLachlin, in her judgment, does not simply defer the bal-
ancing of competing interests to the final stage of the Oakes test; she 
employs a very weak standard of justification for a state restriction on a 
religious practice. This is obscured by her formal adherence to the Oakes 
test, which is understood as a framework for the balancing of competing 
interests. While the dissenting judges in Hutterian Brethren assume that 
the state must make some effort to accommodate a religious practice, 
even to the point of compromising its pursuit of a legitimate public pol-
icy, McLachlin C.J.C. appears to give priority to the state’s policy and 
demands only that the state make space for a religious practice, if it can 
do so without in any real way compromising this policy.  
VI. THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES  
It is not obvious that religious practices should be accommodated — 
that the state should be required to compromise its policy to make space 
for a religious practice. Why should the negative impact on a religious 
practice, of an otherwise legitimate law, not be viewed as simply a con-
sequence and cost of the individual’s religious commitment? In a 
democratic community, individuals are often subject to laws with which 
they disagree. The values, preferences and practices of some citizens will 
sometimes prevail over those of others. While the state should protect the 
individual’s liberty to think and act as he or she chooses, it is not re-
quired to compromise legitimate policy to accommodate an individual’s 
values and practices. If the state is pursuing a legitimate public purpose, 
the detrimental impact of its actions on the practices of an individual or 
group may be viewed as simply a cost they must bear as members of a 
democratic community. The obligation of the state (or the general com-
munity) to treat citizens with equal respect may be satisfied as long as 
each person is able to participate in democratic debate and decision-
making, whether or not her or his views are adopted.  
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Locke in his defence of religious tolerance did not argue that reli-
gious practices should be insulated from legal restriction.51 He took the 
position that the state should not restrict a religious practice, simply be-
cause the practice was thought to be erroneous. However, he accepted 
that when the state is advancing public policy — addressing civic issues 
— it may restrict a religious practice. In Locke’s view, the state has no 
duty to compromise its policy to accommodate a religious practice.  
The Canadian courts purport to apply a more demanding standard.52 
Freedom of religion precludes the state from restricting a religious prac-
tice, because it is mistaken or because it is the wrong way to worship 
God. But the freedom is thought to prohibit more than this. According to 
the Canadian courts, any time the state restricts a religious practice in a 
non-trivial way, it must justify the restriction under section 1. The Chief 
Justice accepts that to justify a restriction the state must satisfy the dif-
ferent elements of the Oakes test, including the proportionality 
requirements. However, she does not believe that the state has a duty to 
modify its law to reasonably accommodate a religious practice, and so it 
is unclear exactly what the justification process involves. The position of 
the dissenting judges is that even when a law advances a legitimate pub-
lic purpose, such as the prevention of identity fraud, some attempt should 
be made to accommodate religious practices that are impeded or  
restricted, and this may involve some compromise of the law’s purpose.  
According to the Canadian courts, the protection or insulation of re-
ligious practice from state action stems from the state’s more general 
duty to remain neutral in matters of faith and take no position on the truth 
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 John Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. by J. Tully (Indianapolis: Hackett Publish-
ing, 1983 [1689]). This was also the view of the U.S. Supreme Court in Employment Division of 
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The government is precluded from acting to suppress reli-
gious practices that are mistaken but is free to restrict the same practices when advancing secular 
government policy. Justice Scalia seemed particularly concerned about the innumerable forms of 
religious practice and the unlimited ways in which the law might restrict religious freedom. The 
same concern surfaces in McLachlin C.J.C.’s decision. 
52
 The Court’s approach to the state’s restriction of a religious practice was shaped by ear-
lier private sector religious discrimination cases. The seminal Canadian case was Ontario (Human 
Rights Commission) v. Simpsons Sears, [1985] S.C.J. No. 74, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.), in which 
the Supreme Court held that under provincial anti-discrimination legislation, a private employer had 
a duty to accommodate the religious practices of an employee unless doing so would cause undue 
hardship to the employer. In this case, an employee had converted to Seventh-Day Adventism and as 
a consequence was no longer able to work on Saturdays. Saturday, was Simpsons Sears’ busiest day 
and the store had a policy that all full-time retail employees must work on that day. The store’s pol-
icy was not meant to exclude those who kept Saturday as their Sabbath and it was not arbitrary; 
nevertheless, Simpsons Sears was required to accommodate her — to exempt her from the Saturday 
work requirement.  
(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)   ACCOMMODATION WITHOUT COMPROMISE 117 
or falsity of spiritual beliefs.53 But, as Locke’s account of religious free-
dom illustrates, the claim that religion is a private matter with which the 
state should not interfere, is not sufficient to justify a duty on the state to 
accommodate religious practices. The protection or insulation of reli-
gious practice from state action that advances an otherwise legitimate 
public purpose must rest on more than the Lockean assertion that reli-
gious matters are private and distinct from civic concerns.54 It must rest 
on a normative claim that religion should be protected as “private”, even 
when it touches on matters of public concern or conflicts with law.  
Underlying the neutrality requirement, and the insulation of religious 
beliefs or practices from public decision-making, is a conception of reli-
gious belief as a deeply rooted element of the individual’s identity. 
Religion orients an individual in the world, shaping his or her perception 
of the social and natural orders and providing a moral framework for his 
or her actions. Because religion is deeply rooted, when the state treats the 
individual’s religious practices and beliefs as less important or less true 
than the practices of others, or when the individual’s religious commu-
nity is marginalized by the state in some way, the individual adherent 
may experience this not simply as a rejection of his or her views and val-
ues, or a repudiation of the truth, but as a denial of his or her equal 
worth, or at least as something that affects him or her very personally.55 
There are additional and related reasons supporting a duty to accommo-
date. Because religion is a private matter, it may easily be lost sight of in 
the formulation of public policy. In pursuing a particular public objective 
the state may fail to recognize the negative impact of its actions on the 
practices of a minority religious community. The duty to accommodate 
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 The commitment to state neutrality in religious matters, is most clearly affirmed in the 
case of Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village), 
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 Central to Locke’s defence of religious tolerance was the distinction between spiritual 
and civic concerns. This distinction is even more problematic today, as a consequence of the growth 
of religious diversity and the expansion of state power.  
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 Corbiere v. Canada, [1999] S.C.J. No. 24, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, at para. 13 (S.C.C.). Re-
ligion may be treated as a matter of identity that should be treated with equal respect, simply because 
we have no other conceptual framework within which to fit it. 
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may rest on an awareness that the religious practices of historically 
dominant groups have shaped social interaction and have already been 
factored into public policy. It may also rest on a desire to avoid the alien-
ation of minority religious communities and the possibility of civil 
disobedience.  
Yet the insulation of religion from public action is difficult to main-
tain consistently. The problem is not simply that religious beliefs involve 
claims about what is true and right that must remain open to contest. The 
more fundamental problem is that religious beliefs often have public im-
plications. They often have something to say about the way we should 
treat or interact with others and about the kind of society we should work 
to create. The individual may believe that she or he has a religious duty 
to work for social justice or to build God’s Kingdom on earth. The state 
may adopt policies that are inconsistent with what some religious adher-
ents understand to be just. The religious beliefs of some in the political 
community may be repudiated by state action or their religious purposes 
or practices may be restricted by the state as harmful or contrary to the 
public interest. Even if the state seeks to avoid passing judgment, at least 
directly, on the truth or falsity of a spiritual belief, it will sometimes pur-
sue goals that are inconsistent with particular religious practices. 
When the religious practices of an individual or community affect 
the interests of others, they cannot simply be insulated from public action 
and treated as private. Religions that emphasize the individual’s direct 
and personal relationship with God or the supernatural — that focus on 
otherworldly matters — will seldom come into conflict with state action. 
As well, mainstream religious practices that have shaped the social life 
and public values of the larger community are less likely to conflict with 
the law. Conflict may occur more frequently in the case of “lived” relig-
ions that put greater emphasis on ritual or that govern significant 
elements of the individual’s life. An insular religious community, that 
follows a religious way of life and seeks to separate itself from the larger 
community, raises particular accommodation issues. The members of the 
Wilson Colony argued that the photo requirement prevented them from 
driving and that the inability to drive compromised their self-sufficiency, 
an important element of their spiritual way of life. The difficulty for the 
courts in dealing with a claim to accommodate a “way of life”, rather 
than a discrete practice, is not just the likelihood or frequency of con-
flicts with law, but more fundamentally the collapse of the distinction 
between religion and non-religion — upon which the special treatment of 
religion depends. Moreover, if self-sufficiency is understood to mean 
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independence from the larger community, the claim to accommodation 
may sometimes take the form of a general rejection of state authority — 
a claim the courts cannot contemplate.56  
Chief Justice McLachlin observes that:  
Because religion touches so many facets of daily life, and because a 
host of different religions with different rites and practices co-exist in 
our society, it is inevitable that some religious practices will come into 
conflict with laws and regulatory systems of general application.57  
Her concern is that “the broad scope of the Charter guarantee [means 
that m]uch of the regulation of a modern state could be claimed … to 
have more than a trivial impact on sincerely held religious belief”.58 She 
notes that as a consequence of the test set out in Amselem for determin-
ing whether a practice or belief falls within the scope of the freedom’s 
protection — that the individual has a sincere belief in its spiritual sig-
nificance — a wide range of practices may conflict with state law.59 
However, the majority’s adoption of a weak standard of justification rests 
not simply on the practical concern identified by McLachlin C.J.C. that, 
given the innumerable ways in which religion may conflict with law, a 
duty to accommodate would severely limit the state’s ability to act in the 
public interest. It reflects also, and more significantly, an ambivalence 
about the specialness of religion — about whether religious beliefs and 
practices are different from other beliefs and practices in a way that justi-
fies their insulation from public decision-making. The real problem with 
the courts’ reliance on a subjective test is that it undermines the claim 
that religious beliefs are special and should be treated differently from 
other beliefs — from other “choices” or “personal commitments”. 
Sometimes the conflict between law and religious practice is direct, 
i.e., the law’s purpose is directly at odds with the religious practice. A di-
rect conflict occurs, for example, when a religious group believes that 
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 Supra, note 1, at para. 90. The Chief Justice observes, at para. 36, that:  
Freedom of religion presents a particular challenge in this respect because of the broad 
scope of the Charter guarantee. Much of the regulation of a modern state could be 
claimed by various individuals to have a more than trivial impact on a sincerely held reli-
gious belief. Giving effect to each of their religious claims could seriously undermine the 
universality of many regulatory programs, including the attempt to reduce abuse of 
driver’s licences at issue here, to the overall detriment of the community.  
58
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children should be physically disciplined in a way that is contrary to child 
welfare law. More often the conflict between law and religious practice is 
incidental — the result simply of the manner in which the state has chosen 
to advance a particular goal. In such a case, it may be possible for the state 
to advance the law’s purpose in a different way — through different means 
— so that it does not, at least to the same degree, interfere with the reli-
gious practice. But the adoption of different means will in most cases 
detract from the law’s effectiveness in advancing a particular policy. In 
other words, the state’s purpose will be compromised to some extent. In 
the case of either a direct or an indirect conflict, it is difficult to see how 
the courts are to determine the appropriate “balance” or trade-off between 
the law’s objective and the religious practice. If public decision-makers 
have decided, for example, that corporal punishment of children is wrong 
or that sexual orientation discrimination ought to be proscribed or that the 
inclusion of a photo in a facial recognition data bank is necessary to pre-
vent identity fraud, how is a court to decide whether an exception to these 
norms or requirements should be granted to a religious individual who be-
lieves that corporal punishment is mandated by God, or that homosexuality 
is sinful, or that God has commanded him or her not to have his or her 
photo taken?60  
There is simply no basis for the courts to compare a religious prac-
tice’s importance or weight, which is based not on its truth or utility but 
simply on its significance to the individual, with that of a democratically- 
selected public policy or value and determine the fair or appropriate bal-
ance or trade-off between them. From a secular/public perspective the 
religious practice has no intrinsic value; indeed the court is to take no 
position concerning its truth. The court recognizes that the practice is 
significant to the individual, as something he or she believes is required 
by God or will bring him or her closer to the divine, and that it governs 
his or her actions and underpins his or her worldview. A judgment about 
the relative value of a religious practice will be based either on the indi-
vidual’s report of its importance (and it will invariably be of vital 
importance to that person) or on a judgment by the court about the place 
of the practice within a religious tradition, which is exactly the kind of 
judgment the Supreme Court sought to avoid in Amselem.  
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 When the legislature decides that corporal punishment is wrongful and should be prohib-
ited, they do not frame their judgment as a rejection of a religious view. They do not address the 
issue in terms of what God has or has not commanded. But unless we hold to an entirely artificial 
separation of law and religion — or public and religious morality — the legislature’s judgment must 
be understood as a repudiation of the religious view that corporal punishment is right or moral.  
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If a law that is pursuing an otherwise legitimate objective, restricts a 
religious practice, the court must decide whether the government’s policy 
should be compromised to accommodate the practice. But it is not clear 
how a court is to compare and balance these competing claims. It is one 
thing for the court to decide that a law should be compromised in some 
minor way to make space for a religious practice — to consider whether 
the law might be advanced almost as effectively if an exemption were 
granted. Such a judgment may be based on a determination that the law’s 
purpose is minor or the impact of accommodation will be small. It is 
quite another for the court to engage in a more general and open form of 
balancing of interests, which would require the court to assess the sig-
nificance or weight not just of the state’s policy but also of the religious 
practice. The problem of “balancing” points us again to the more funda-
mental issue of why religious beliefs and practices should be insulated 
from democratic decision-making — of why democratically selected 
policies should be compromised to make space for practices that are pub-
licly valued simply because they matter deeply to the individual.  
VII. THE CANADIAN RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION CASES  
The Hutterian Brethren judgment may not represent a break from the 
pattern of the Court’s previous religious restriction cases. Despite its 
formal commitment to accommodation, the Supreme Court of Canada in 
previous decisions has employed a weak standard of justification for the 
restriction of a religious practice. In earlier cases, the Court has been 
willing to uphold a restriction on religious practice, if the law has a le-
gitimate objective (i.e., an objective other than the suppression of 
erroneous religious practices) that would be compromised if an exception 
were granted. The Court has been willing to accommodate the religious 
practice only if this could be done without compromising the state’s pur-
pose in any meaningful way.  
In Edwards Books, several retailers challenged the constitutionality 
of an Ontario law that prohibited retail stores from operating on Sunday, 
unless they were under a certain size and were closed on Saturday.61 A 
majority of the Court, in a judgment written by Dickson C.J.C., accepted 
that the purpose of the law was not to enforce Sunday as the Sabbath (to 
enforce a religious practice) but was instead to create a common pause 
day, enabling retail workers to be with their families at least one day  
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during the week. The Court held that even though the law did not compel 
anyone to engage in a religious practice, it indirectly restricted the reli-
gious practice of those who regarded Saturday as the Sabbath, and so 
breached section 2(a). The law made it very difficult for Jewish and Sev-
enth-Day Adventist retailers to close their stores on Saturday, and so 
amounted to an indirect restriction on their religious practice. The Court 
recognized that if a retailer was required by law to remain closed on 
Sunday, he or she would find it very costly, perhaps commercially unvia-
ble, to follow his or her religion and remain closed on Saturday as well. 
However, a majority of the Court in Edwards Books upheld the restric-
tion under section 1, as reasonable and demonstrably justified. The 
majority accepted that the law had a substantial and compelling purpose 
and impaired the freedom no more than was necessary, since it permitted 
smaller retail operations to open Sunday, if they were closed on Satur-
day.62 
Chief Justice Dickson, for the majority in Edwards Books, accepted 
that minor or trivial burdens on religious practice would not breach  
section 2(a), but had no difficulty finding that the Sunday closing  
requirement represented a significant burden on the religious practice of 
Saturday Sabbatarians. The provincial government had argued that any 
harm to the business interests of Saturday Sabbatarians was the conse-
quence of their religious practice rather than of the law. However, 
Dickson C.J.C. distinguished between a “natural disadvantage”, which is 
the consequence of the religion, and a “purely statutory disability” and 
held that the burden on religious practice in this case was the conse-
quence of the Sunday closing law, and was, therefore, a purely statutory 
disability: 
I agree ... that the state is normally under no duty under section 2(a) to 
take affirmative action to eliminate the natural costs of religious 
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practices. But ... [the Act] has the effect of leaving the Saturday 
observer at the same natural disadvantage [as the Sunday observer] 
relative to the non-observer and adding the new, purely statutory 
disadvantage of being closed for an extra day relative to the Sunday 
observer. Just as the Act makes it less costly for Sunday observers to 
practice their religious beliefs, it thereby makes it more expensive for 
some Jewish and Seventh-day Adventist retailers to practice theirs.63 
Even though the government was pursuing a legitimate objective, the 
creation of a common pause day, Dickson C.J.C. found that the relative 
disadvantage experienced by Saturday Sabbatarians was a statutory dis-
ability rather than a cost of their religion.  
The Chief Justice’s determination seems to be based the presence of 
an identifiable state act that has a differential impact on a particular reli-
gious group. In the courts’ equality rights jurisprudence, the issue is 
whether the law has a disadvantaging impact on the members of an iden-
tity group or a group that historically has been subjected to stereotyping 
or systemic disadvantage. It does not matter that the state is pursuing a 
legitimate public purpose. The state is expected to compromise the pur-
suit of that purpose and make reasonable accommodation for the 
minority group and so avoid contributing to its further marginalization. 
The Court noted that the Sunday closing requirement did not simply im-
pose a burden on the religious practice of those who would keep 
Saturday as the Sabbath. It also gave Christians, who honour Sunday as 
the Sabbath, a relative advantage over Saturday Sabbatarians. Even if the 
law was not intended to favour or support Christian practice, that was its 
effect. Moreover, the choice of Sunday as the common pause day, was 
not accidental. It reflected the Christian history/tradition of the commu-
nity, and so may be seen by non-Christians as support for the Christian 
faith. While the Court was unwilling to see the law as compelling a reli-
gious practice, the Christian roots of the law (and its favouring of 
Christian practice) seemed to play a role in the Court’s determination that 
the law indirectly restricted the religious practice of Saturday Sabbatari-
ans. The differential impact of the law on Sunday and Saturday 
Sabbatarians led the Court to conclude that the burden on the latter was 
not simply a natural cost of their faith, but was instead the consequence 
of the law. Indeed, in the later Supreme Court decision of Adler v. On-
tario, Sopinka J. clearly stated that the unequal treatment of different 
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religious practices was critical to the finding of a breach of section 2(a) 
in Edwards Books.64 
While Dickson C.J.C. found that section 2(a) had been breached be-
cause the law indirectly restricted the religious practice of Saturday 
Sabbatarians (and perhaps also because it favoured the religious practice 
of Sunday Sabbatarians), he was prepared to uphold the restriction under 
section 1. It had been argued that the exception included in the law (that 
enabled smaller retail operations to open on Sunday if they closed on 
Saturday) should be enlarged to include all retail stores, regardless of 
size, operated by Saturday Sabbatarians. In holding that the narrow ex-
ception did not fail the minimal impairment test, the Chief Justice was 
clear that the state should be given considerable latitude in deciding both 
the necessity and scope of an exception. He noted that a larger exception 
would detract from the effectiveness of the law’s policy, the creation of a 
common pause day.  
In Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that a condominium association’s refusal to permit Orthodox Jewish 
unit-owners to construct succahs on their balconies, as part of the Jewish 
festival of Succot, breached their freedom of religion under the Quebec 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.65 Because the restriction on 
religious practice was imposed by a non-state actor, the Canadian Char-
ter of Rights and Freedom was not applicable. However, the majority 
judgment of Iacobucci J. was clear that “the principles ... applicable in 
cases where an individual alleges that his or her freedom of religion is 
infringed under the Quebec Charter” are also applicable to a claim under 
section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.66 It is 
noteworthy, however, that in Hutterian Brethren, McLachlin C.J.C. indi-
cated that these principles may not be interchangeable: that “reasonable 
accommodation” analysis may be applicable to private sector restrictions 
but not to legal restrictions.67 
In holding that the condominium association had violated the appel-
lants’ freedom of religion, the majority judgment of Iacobucci J. in 
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Amselem made two significant determinations concerning the scope of 
the freedom. First, Iacobucci J. held that freedom of religion under sec-
tion 2(a) protects practices that are not part of an established religious 
belief system. A spiritual practice or belief will fall under the protection 
of section 2(a), even though it is entirely personal, and not part of a more 
widely held religious belief system. Second, a practice will be protected 
under section 2(a) even though it is not regarded as obligatory by the in-
dividual claimant. Freedom of religion protects cultural practices that 
have spiritual significance for the individual, “subjectively connecting” 
that person to the divine. According to Iacobucci J., “[i]t is the religious 
or spiritual essence of the action, not any mandatory or perceived as 
mandatory nature of its observance, that attracts protection.”68 As long as 
the individual has a sincere belief in the spiritual significance of the prac-
tice, any restriction on the practice, direct or indirect, will breach the 
freedom of religion right. Even though not all of the appellants regarded 
the practice of erecting, and residing in, a succah on their own property 
as a religious obligation, the practice was protected as a matter of reli-
gious freedom, because it connected them with the divine. It had for 
them a “nexus with religion ... either by being objectively or subjectively 
obligatory or customary, or by, in general, subjectively engendering a 
personal connection with the divine or with the subject or object of the 
individual’s spiritual faith”.69 
Justice Iacobucci held that preventing the appellants from erecting 
their own succahs amounted to a non-trivial interference with their reli-
gious practice. He went on to hold that the condominium association had 
not established the need for restriction under the limitations provision of 
the Quebec Charter. In response to the safety concerns raised by the as-
sociation, Iacobucci J. noted that the appellants had agreed to set up their 
succahs so that they would not obstruct the fire escape routes. The asso-
ciation’s interest in the aesthetic appearance of the building, he regarded 
as a minor and private concern. He noted that only a small number of 
succahs would be erected for nine days in the year. Moreover, the asso-
ciation could require that the succahs be constructed so as to blend in, as 
much as possible, with the general appearance of the building. Justice 
Iacobucci concluded that:  
In the final analysis ... the alleged intrusions or deleterious effects on 
the respondent’s rights or interests under the circumstances are, at best, 
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minimal and thus cannot be reasonably considered as imposing valid 
limits on the exercise of the appellant’s religious freedom.70  
In Multani,71 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the decision by 
a public school authority to prohibit a Sikh student from wearing a kirpan 
to school, breached section 2(a) and was not justified under section 1. 
The school did not dispute that the student had a sincere belief in the 
spiritual significance of the kirpan, and indeed that he considered himself 
bound to wear it at all times. The position of the school was that the  
kirpan was a weapon, and so was caught by the school’s general ban on 
weapons. According to the Court, the school had a duty to make reason-
able accommodation for the religious practice of minorities and so could 
ban the kirpan only if it represented a threat to school safety. The Court 
found, however, that the safety of the school would not be compromised 
if the kirpan was exempted from the ban on weapons. First, the Court 
took the view that the kirpan was not a weapon but rather a religious 
symbol. Second, the Court noted that there were no recorded incidents in 
Canada of a Sikh student drawing his kirpan in a public school. Third, in 
contrast to an airplane and even a courthouse, where a ban on the kirpan 
might be justified, the school had an ongoing relationship with its stu-
dents and so could monitor their actions and assess the risk of violent 
behaviour. Finally, the Court thought that if the kirpan was sewed into 
the clothes there would be little or no risk of it falling out or being taken 
by anyone else and used as a weapon. The Court held that the kirpan 
should be exempted from the weapons ban, only after determining that it 
was not in fact a weapon and presented no real risk to school safety.  
In Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teach-
ers, the issue was whether the British Columbia College of Teachers 
(“the BCCT”) had acted outside its powers when it refused to accredit 
the teacher training program of a private Evangelical Christian university 
on the grounds that the program taught or affirmed the view that homo-
sexuality is sinful.72 According to the BCCT, an institution that wishes to 
train teachers for the public school system must “provide an institutional 
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setting that appropriately prepares future teachers for the public school 
environment, and in particular the diversity of public school students”.73 
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, in a judgment written 
by Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ., held that the decision of the BCCT to 
deny accreditation to TWU’s teaching program should be overturned. For 
the Court, “[t]he issue at the heart of this appeal is how to reconcile the 
religious freedoms of individuals wishing to attend TWU with the equality 
concerns of students in B.C.’s public school system.”74 The Court found 
that, while the BCCT acted properly in considering whether the TWU pro-
gram might contribute to discrimination against gays and lesbians in the 
public schools, the college should also have taken account of the religious 
freedom rights of TWU and its graduates. The Court noted that the BCCT 
decision meant that TWU would have to abandon its religiously based 
“Community Standards”, if it were to run a program that trained teachers 
for the public school system. Graduates of TWU “are likewise affected 
because the affirmation of their religious beliefs and attendance at TWU 
will not lead to certification as public school teachers”.75  
The Court in the TWU case accepted that freedom of religion is “lim-
ited by the rights and freedoms of others” and does not protect religious 
practices that are harmful, including explicit acts of discrimination 
against gays and lesbians.76 However, it found that in this case the limita-
tion on the religious freedom of the staff and graduates of TWU (the 
denial of accreditation) was imposed in the absence of any evidence that 
the program had a detrimental impact on the school system. According to 
the Court, the TWU Community Standards simply prescribed the con-
duct of members while attending TWU and so gave no reason to 
anticipate intolerant behaviour by TWU-trained teachers in the public 
schools. The Court concluded that in the absence of any concrete evi-
dence that training teachers at TWU fosters discrimination in the public 
schools of B.C., the BCCT had no grounds to deny accreditation to 
TWU, and interfere with the religious freedom of TWU instructors and 
students to hold certain beliefs. The Court found no conflict in this case 
between religious freedom and sexual orientation equality. If a teacher 
engages in discriminatory conduct, he or she “can be subject to discipli-
nary proceedings before the BCCT”.77 But, said the Court, the right of 
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gays and lesbians to be free from discrimination is not violated simply 
because a teacher holds discriminatory views.  
While the majority judgment in Hutterian Brethren seems to diverge 
from these earlier decisions, particularly in its repudiation of “reasonable 
accommodation” analysis, the result in that case is not out of line with 
these decisions. In these earlier cases, when the Court decided that ac-
commodation should be made, it did so only because, in its view, the 
exception would not compromise the law’s purpose in any meaningful 
way. According to McLachlin C.J.C. in these cases, the Court “found that 
the potential risk [to public policy] was too speculative”.78 
Yet, as these cases illustrate, even a weak standard of justification 
that focuses principally on the minimal impairment requirement opens up 
some room for accommodation — for the Court to decide that a minor 
compromise of the law’s objective should be made to create space for a 
religious practice. Indeed, as LeBel J. observes in Hutterian Brethren, the 
Chief Justice’s statement of the minimal impairment test, which requires 
that the state employ less restrictive means if these will achieve the 
state’s objective “in a real and substantial manner”, “appear[s] to signal 
that, even at the minimal impairment stage, the objective might have to 
be redefined and circumscribed”.79 If a law will fail the minimal impair-
ment test simply because its purpose could be advanced substantially or 
almost as effectively in another way that did not impair the religious 
practice, then there will be some degree of religious accommodation. The 
courts may protect religious practices from state restriction at the mar-
gins, requiring the state to compromise its objectives in minor ways to 
accommodate practices that matter deeply to their adherents. These are 
pragmatic decisions though, that do not fit with the Court’s aspiration to 
resolve rights issues in a principled way. And indeed, McLachlin C.J.C. 
appears to be unwilling to relax the minimal impairment test in any sig-
nificant way.80  
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There is no clear or principled way for the courts to determine the 
fair and appropriate trade-off between a religious practice and a democ-
ratically selected public purpose. However, a flexible approach to the 
minimal impairment test may permit minor and pragmatic compromises 
of state policy to create space for religious practices. There are a few 
other situations in which the courts may decide that a compromise of the 
law’s purpose is appropriate. Accommodation may be granted to minor-
ity practices, when state law reflects and advantages the practices of a 
historically dominant religious community, for example in the creation of 
statutory holidays. But, as noted earlier, the Court in Edwards Books was 
not prepared to enlarge the statutory exemption that had been written into 
the statute. Accommodation may also be appropriate in the case of pater-
nalistic laws — for example, an exception for a Sikh man from a law that 
requires all persons to wear a helmet when riding a motorcycle or bicy-
cle. Paternalistic laws are intended to protect individuals from their own 
bad decisions. A commitment to religious freedom, or state neutrality 
towards religion, may at least limit the state’s ability to treat self-
regarding religious practices as unwise — as something against which 
the individuals needs to be protected.81 Yet, even in the case of appar-
ently paternalistic laws the courts have been hesitant to recognize 
exceptions. The reluctance to recognize a religious exception in such 
cases appears to be based on a recognition that no law is simply paternal-
istic and that any time an individual is injured there will be an impact on 
others, including friends and family members, employers or co-workers, 
and of course the general public, which must cover the injured person’s 
medical costs.  
VIII. CONCLUSION  
Section 2(a) is breached any time the state restricts a religious prac-
tice in a non-trivial way. The state must justify the restriction under 
section 1 and the Oakes test, and this is said to involve a balancing of 
competing interests, the individual’s freedom to practise his or her relig-
ion and the state’s ability to advance the public good. But in practice, the 
courts have been unwilling to require the state to compromise its policy 
in any significant way. The legislative objective is given priority and is 
not “balanced” against the religious practice. An exception to the law 
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will be made for a religious practice only if this can be done without de-
tracting from the effectiveness of the law. Or, put another way, the 
practice will be accommodated if it can be viewed as private, as separate 
or distinct from public concerns.  
I have argued that the Court’s adoption of this weak standard of justi-
fication under section 1 reflects an ambivalence about the nature of 
religious commitment and its place in the public life of the community. 
Because religion is deeply rooted, a matter of identity that shapes the 
individual’s worldview at a fundamental level, the restriction or margin-
alization by lawmakers of an individual’s religious practices may be 
viewed as a denial of her or his equal worth. Yet at the same time, be-
cause different religions make claims that can be described as right or 
wrong and that sometimes address or affect the rights or interests of oth-
ers, they cannot simply be insulated from public decision-making. The 
requirement that the state remain neutral in matters of faith rests on the 
idea that religion and politics are separate spheres of life. But in reality, 
religion and politics overlap in a variety of ways.  
There is no principled way for the courts to balance democratically 
selected public values or purposes against the spiritual beliefs and prac-
tices of a religious individual or community and decide that one should 
prevail over the other in the circumstances. At most, the courts can pro-
tect religious practices from state restriction at the margins, requiring the 
state to compromise its objectives in minor ways, to create space for 
practices that matter deeply to their adherents. This type of pragmatic 
decision-making, however, does not fit with the Court’s aspiration to re-
solve rights issues in a principled way. The majority decision in the 
Hutterian Brethren case sought to determine the justification of a restric-
tion on religious practice using the Oakes framework for the balancing of 
competing interests. The result in that case was that the state was found 
to have no duty to compromise its policy, in even the most minor way, to 
accommodate a religious practice. 
